Frightening Parallels with Threat Posed by Rancho Storage Tanks
By Paul Rosenberg, Senior Editor
On Aug. 5, after months of delay, a group of citizens concerned about the public safety threat posed by Rancho LPG met with Port of Los Angeles Executive Director Gene Seroka and staff members.
“Mr. Seroka expressed his abiding commitment to the safety and security of the port complex, as well as the surrounding communities,” said port spokesman Phillip Sanfield. “The group had an opportunity to share its views and concerns regarding Rancho LPG. Port senior staff is reviewing the information provided and will follow up in writing with the group.”
Rancho LPG is a liquefied petroleum storage facility located near the confluence of Gaffey Street and the 110 Freeway.
Local activists Janet Gunter, Noel Weiss and Adrian Martinez and other participants expressed cautious optimism in the immediate aftermath of the meeting. But a deadly explosion in the Chinese port city of Tianjin, just one week later, Aug. 12, renewed a looming sense of urgency and impending threat.
“Why is 25 million gallons of highly explosive butane and propane gases being stored within 1,000 feet (333 yards) of residences, schools, shops and public highway?” Gunter asked in an email linking to a story about the Chinese blast. “Why is it allowed to sit on the inner harbor, threatening the destruction of both ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach…and all of those within a 3-mile blast radius?”
Although entirely different explosive agents were involved, there were still strong parallels between the Tianjin blast—with a death toll now at 114, including 39 firefighters—and a possible disaster scenario at Rancho LPG.
“China on Friday defended firefighters who initially hosed water on a blaze in a warehouse storing volatile chemicals, a response foreign experts said could have contributed to two huge blasts that killed 56 people,” Reuters reported. “Chemical safety experts said calcium carbide reacts with water to create acetylene, a highly explosive gas. An explosion could be caused if firefighters sprayed the calcium carbide with water, they said.”
“Calcium carbide CaC2 and water react to make acetylene, C2H2, which is the material in welding torches,” said retired oil industry consultant Connie Rutter. “So, whatever first caused an explosion, when firemen trained water on more calcium carbide, they increased the explosion, rather than preventing it.”
This recalls Rancho’s ill-considered reliance on the standard response, fire-fighting foam, which is generally effective against gasoline fires, but is not recommended for LPG fire, as Random Lengths reported in June 2012.
“The reason is that foam is warmer than the liquid butane, which is not yet evaporated, and hastens evaporation, and therefore, burning,” Rutter explained at the time. “There are lots of parallels between the risk from Rancho and the explosion in Tianjin….For one thing, they’re both in port facilities, but Rancho’s position has the added threat of being a good target for terrorists, because an explosion of even one of the smaller ‘bullet’ tanks would do damage to the port property nearby.”
The multiple tanks also set up the risk of multi-explosion disaster, as occurred at Tianjin. Rutter also noted that the position of the bullet tanks violates industry standards which require them to be lined up so that if they explode and become “airborne, like a jet plane,” they cannot hit passerbys.
“Rancho’s bullets line up with the ball field,” she pointed out. “As people near the site in Tianjin describe the explosion, they talk about feeling the first pressure wave. This is what would also happen if a butane tank—the large ones at Rancho—were to release its contents…. Although initially the liquid would be caught in the impound basin, it would very rapidly vaporize as it picks up heat from the air and the ground, and increase 230 times in size.
“This rapid increase in volume would first form a pressure wave, invisible, but strong enough to knock things over…. This will happen before it ignites! If it finds a source of ignition—even a static charge, or car engine—it will form a fiery explosion. Now, that extra heat will cause whatever butane has not already evaporated to evaporate, creating a pool fire. This unfolding, multistage disaster is very much like what occurred in Tianjin,” Rutter noted.
“Other similarities between the Tianjin site and Rancho are that the public was closer to the site than the Chinese environmental rules allow,” according to the New York Times report. “There are no limits to how close people should be allowed to live in the U.S. rules…but the American Petroleum Institute standard holds that no tank or equipment should be closer than 200 feet from the facility border. Rancho fails that on 3 sides. This reflects the fact that it’s never gone through a permit review by the city.”
Finally, Rutter noted that both here and in Tianjin the rules on the books fail to protect the people.
“That’s not surprising in a totalitarian system like China, but we’re a democracy,” she said. “We should expect to be protected, for the rules to be transparent and for them to be enforced. But that’s not been the case.”
“In the wake of China’s massive destruction, deaths and casualties in their port city…and recently what seems like a never-ending stream of ruptured pipelines, toxic contamination and devastating explosions and fires…our society’s reckless ambivalence to disaster prevention appears to be catching up with us!” Homeowner activist Janet Gunter wrote in an email after the explosion. “By their own admission…Plains All American Pipeline, AKA Rancho LPG, in LA’s Harbor area stores…(at their 42-year-old, 25- million-gallon butane and propane gas storage location) the energy equivalent…of over 50 atomic bombs…all on the back doorstep of pre-existing homes and schools, on the precipice of the 110 Freeway, within one-quarter-mile of the inner harbor of the Port of LA…and amazingly a mere 150 feet of the ‘active’ Palos Verdes Fault (magnitude 7.3) on [U.S. Geological Survey] designated ‘landslide’ and ‘liquefaction’ areas….Its two massive 12.5 million gallon butane tanks were built without building permits over 4 decades ago to a seismic substandard of 5.5, the email noted.
“When will the relentless disregard for public safety end? When will the political “will” to prevent these cataclysmic losses kick in?”
On Aug. 17, Sanfield provided additional assurances of port safety, in contrast with Tianjin.
“The Port of Los Angeles works with all levels of government as well as other maritime stakeholders to inspect and monitor hazardous materials coming into the port complex,” he said.
He ticked off a long list of agencies, starting with Homeland Security and the Coast Guard.
“Through a variety of federal, state and local laws, as well as inspection and enforcement procedures, the agencies work collaboratively to keep the port complex safe,” he said. “All dangerous cargo that passes through the port requires a permit….Tankers and hazardous materials coming into the port are inspected by the Los Angeles Fire Department. Additionally, explosive shipments are inspected by Port Police hazmat units. Additional preventative, inspection and safety measures are handled by Customs and Border Protection, as well as the U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security.
“If an incident were to take place, all the above-mentioned agencies train regularly through a unified command model to react swiftly with whatever resources are necessary…. This multilayer agency prevention and inspection approach makes the port complex as prepared as possible to prevent an accident and respond with appropriate resources if one were to occur.”
As for the Tianjin tragedy, Sanfield said, “Details have yet to be confirmed but it appears that exceeding large volumes of multiple hazardous materials were stored in a factory-like setting. Partner agencies here will dissect information as it becomes available from China and review for lessons that may be applied in the port complex.”
“In truth, the port has performed a mammoth job in the coordination of container inspections and the litany of regulatory obligations set forth to protect it on that level,” said Gunter, in response. “No small job to be sure. That does not go unnoticed nor unappreciated by community residents.
“However, there appears to be a huge gaping hole in their guardianship…. A simple look at the Plains All American Pipeline-operated Rancho LPG facility and its storage proximity (within one quarter-mile of the port) of over 25 million gallons of highly explosive butane and propane gases, clues you into the incredible vulnerability of the port from the mere presence of it,” Gunter said.
There are “two rubs” here for the local communities, Gunter said.
First, “The port introduced this hazardous and highly explosive operation into our community over 40 years ago, (without a public process and exempting it from various regulations) and then more than a decade ago terminated its ocean shipping opportunity based on the much delayed realization that it was a ‘far too dangerous cargo’ to be shipped out of their port.”
Second, Gunter said, “When the port refused to renew the pipeline to the ocean shipping wharf, which transported 68 percent of its gas by sea, the facility’s business model changed “dramatically” with the gas suddenly shifted entirely to transport by rail and truck. This major change should have triggered a new environmental impact report, but, did not.”
The rail transport now used is “more inherently dangerous” than the pipeline was, but nothing’s been done to protect the community—in stark contrast to how much effort is put into other safety measures such as those Sanfield laid out.
Chinese officials have promised a thorough investigation into the causes of the Tianjin tragedy. So far, American officials have promised nothing better than to protect Harbor Area neighbors of Rancho LPG.
So far. But there’s still hope that this will change.